In races for the White House , a voter 's incentive , at the margin , is to lean Republican .
Although a GOP president may limit local benefits to the voter 's particular district/state , such a president is also likely to be more effective at preventing other districts/states and their legislators from bringing home the local benefits .
The individual voter 's standing consequently will be enhanced through lower taxes .
While this theory is exceedingly simple , it appears to explain several things .
First , why ticket splitting has increased and taken the peculiar pattern that it has over the past half century : Prior to the election of Franklin Roosevelt as president and the advent of the New Deal , government occupied a much smaller role in society and the prisoner 's dilemma problem confronting voters in races for Congress was considerably less severe .
Second , it explains why voters hold Congress in disdain but generally love their own congressional representatives : Any individual legislator 's constituents appreciate the specific benefits that the legislator wins for them but not the overall cost associated with every other legislator doing likewise for his own constituency .
Third , the theory suggests why legislators who pay too much attention to national policy making relative to local benefit-seeking have lower security in office .
For example , first-term - term members of the House , once the most vulnerable of incumbents , have become virtually immune to defeat .