Lexicographer review — Page 17 of 37 S2

Tuesday 's rout of a GOP congressional hopeful in a Mississippi district that has n't backed a Democratic presidential candidate since Adlai Stevenson is another reminder that , at least at the federal level , political “ ticket splitting “ has been on the rise over the past half century .

In only one presidential election year prior to 1948 did more than 20 % of the nation 's congressional districts choose a different party 's candidate for the White House than for the House of Representatives .

Now that percentage routinely equals a third and twice has been above 40 % .

As we know , voters tend to favor Republicans more in races for president than in those for Congress .

In every presidential election over the past half century , except for the Goldwater presidential candidacy , the GOP has captured a greater percentage of the major - party popular vote for president than it has of congressional seats or the popular vote for Congress .

Prior to 1932 , the pattern was nearly the opposite .

What accounts for the results of recent decades ?

A simple economic theory may provide at least a partial explanation for the split personality displayed by Americans in the voting booth .

The theory relies on three assumptions :

In every presidential election over the past half century , except for the Goldwater presidential candidacy , the GOP has captured a greater percentage of the major - party popular vote for president than it has of congressional seats or the popular vote for Congress .

Prior to 1932 , the pattern was nearly the opposite .

What accounts for the results of recent decades ?

A simple economic theory may provide at least a partial explanation for the split personality displayed by Americans in the voting booth .

The theory relies on three assumptions :

Prior to 1932 , the pattern was nearly the opposite .

What accounts for the results of recent decades ?

A simple economic theory may provide at least a partial explanation for the split personality displayed by Americans in the voting booth .

The theory relies on three assumptions :

1 -RRB- Voters can “ buy “ one of two brands when they select their political agents -- a Republican brand that believes in the minimalist state and in the virtues of private markets over the vices of public action , and a Democratic brand that believes in big government and in public intervention to remedy the excesses attendant to the pursuit of private interest .

The theory relies on three assumptions :

1 -RRB- Voters can “ buy “ one of two brands when they select their political agents -- a Republican brand that believes in the minimalist state and in the virtues of private markets over the vices of public action , and a Democratic brand that believes in big government and in public intervention to remedy the excesses attendant to the pursuit of private interest .

2 -RRB- Congressional representatives have two basic responsibilities while voting in office -- dealing with national issues -LRB- programmatic actions such as casting roll call votes on legislation that imposes costs and/or confers benefits on the population at large -RRB- and attending to local issues -LRB- constituency service and pork barrel -RRB- .

3 -RRB- Republican congressional representatives , because of their belief in a minimalist state , are less willing to engage in local benefit-seeking than are Democratic members of Congress .

If these assumptions hold , voters in races for Congress face what in economic theory is called a prisoner 's dilemma and have an incentive , at the margin , to lean Democratic .

3 -RRB- Republican congressional representatives , because of their belief in a minimalist state , are less willing to engage in local benefit-seeking than are Democratic members of Congress .

If these assumptions hold , voters in races for Congress face what in economic theory is called a prisoner 's dilemma and have an incentive , at the margin , to lean Democratic .

If they put a Republican into office , not only will they acquire less in terms of local benefits but their selected legislator will be relatively powerless to prevent other legislators from “ bringing home the bacon “ to their respective constituencies .

Each legislator , after all , is only one out of 535 when it comes to national policy making .

In races for the White House , a voter 's incentive , at the margin , is to lean Republican .

3 -RRB- Republican congressional representatives , because of their belief in a minimalist state , are less willing to engage in local benefit-seeking than are Democratic members of Congress .

If these assumptions hold , voters in races for Congress face what in economic theory is called a prisoner 's dilemma and have an incentive , at the margin , to lean Democratic .

If they put a Republican into office , not only will they acquire less in terms of local benefits but their selected legislator will be relatively powerless to prevent other legislators from “ bringing home the bacon “ to their respective constituencies .

Each legislator , after all , is only one out of 535 when it comes to national policy making .

In races for the White House , a voter 's incentive , at the margin , is to lean Republican .

If they put a Republican into office , not only will they acquire less in terms of local benefits but their selected legislator will be relatively powerless to prevent other legislators from “ bringing home the bacon “ to their respective constituencies .

Each legislator , after all , is only one out of 535 when it comes to national policy making .

In races for the White House , a voter 's incentive , at the margin , is to lean Republican .

Although a GOP president may limit local benefits to the voter 's particular district/state , such a president is also likely to be more effective at preventing other districts/states and their legislators from bringing home the local benefits .

The individual voter 's standing consequently will be enhanced through lower taxes .

In races for the White House , a voter 's incentive , at the margin , is to lean Republican .

Although a GOP president may limit local benefits to the voter 's particular district/state , such a president is also likely to be more effective at preventing other districts/states and their legislators from bringing home the local benefits .

The individual voter 's standing consequently will be enhanced through lower taxes .

While this theory is exceedingly simple , it appears to explain several things .

First , why ticket splitting has increased and taken the peculiar pattern that it has over the past half century : Prior to the election of Franklin Roosevelt as president and the advent of the New Deal , government occupied a much smaller role in society and the prisoner 's dilemma problem confronting voters in races for Congress was considerably less severe .

Second , it explains why voters hold Congress in disdain but generally love their own congressional representatives : Any individual legislator 's constituents appreciate the specific benefits that the legislator wins for them but not the overall cost associated with every other legislator doing likewise for his own constituency .

Third , the theory suggests why legislators who pay too much attention to national policy making relative to local benefit-seeking have lower security in office .

For example , first-term - term members of the House , once the most vulnerable of incumbents , have become virtually immune to defeat .

The one exception to this recent trend was the defeat of 13 of the 52 freshman Republicans brought into office in 1980 by the Reagan revolution and running for re-election in 1982 .

Because these freshmen placed far more emphasis on their partisan role -- spreading the Reagan revolution -- in national policy making , they were more vulnerable to defeat .